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SEXUAL DESIRE: A MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE
EROTIC. By Roger Scruton.1 New York, N.Y.: The Free
Press. 1986. Pp. x, 428. $25.00.
MORALITY, SEX, AND THE CONSTITUTION: A
CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE ON THE POWER OF
GOVERNMENT TO REGULATE PRIVATE SEXUAL
CONDUCT BETWEEN CONSENTING ADULTS. By G.
Sidney Buchanan.2 Lanham, Md.: University Press of
America. 1985. Pp. xiii, 227. Cloth, $23.75; paper, $11.50.
ARE GAY RIGHTS RIGHT? By Roger J. Magnuson.3
Minneapolis, Mn.: Straightgate Press. 1985. Pp. ix, 137.
David A.J. Richards4

Traditional concepts of gender and sexuality are now very
much in controversy in advanced Western societies on grounds of
justice that, for Americans, intersect with constitutional values of
liberty and equality. The constitutional right to privacy, for example, has been elaborated by the Supreme Court to immunize contraception and abortion from criminal penalties that reflected
traditional conceptions of the proper role of sexuality in general and
women's sexuality in particular. More recently, a sharply divided
Supreme Court declined to extend the constitutional right to privacy to consensual homosexual relations, expressly legitimating the
traditional moral attitude. Elsewhere, on grounds of equal protection, the Court has aggressively scrutinized and struck down gender
classifications that reflect traditional notions about women's role,
but the federal judiciary has extended no comparable scrutiny to
classifications on the basis of sexual preferences that reflect traditional views of homosexuality.
The three books reviewed here endeavor to defend traditional
sexual morality. They offer a spectrum of conservative stances:
Roger Scruton's measured and highly tentative skepticism; G. Sidney Buchanan's centrist moderation; and Roger J. Magnuson's attack on the idea that homosexuals have any distinctive rights, let
alone constitutional rights.
I. Reader in Philosophy, Birkbeck College, London.
2. Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center.
3. Member, Minnesota bar.
4. Professor of Law, New York University.
5. See, e.g., Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

464

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 4:463

Both Buchanan and Magnuson write from the perspectives of
Christian sexual morality, and at crucial points they appeal to Biblical texts and associated interpretive traditions. In consequence,
their arguments have less value to constitutional lawyers than arguments that rely on more broadly accepted traditions.6 Indeed, constitutional guarantees of toleration require, I believe, that
governmental coercion be justified by reference to something
broader than Christianity, or it will fail constitutional tests of sectarian neutrality. 1 Since Buchanan and Magnuson are so naively
unmindful of these constitutional principles, their arguments are,
constitutionally speaking, barely literate.
In contrast, Scruton's argument is studiously secular and thus
is of correspondingly greater interest for purposes of American constitutional law, although his thesis is not about law as such, and as
an English philosopher he has no apparent interest in American
constitutional law. Accordingly, I will examine Scruton's arguments at greater length than the others.
I
Scruton begins Sexual Desire ominously by stating his objective
as follows:
Whether or not the reader comes to agree with my particular conclusions, he will, I
hope, agree that it need not be absurd to condemn homosexual intercourse, fornication, masturbation, or whatever, even though we all have an urge to do these things,
and even though there may be no God who forbids them.

Scruton eventually addresses these issues some 300 pages later, but
his discussion is tentative, inconclusive, and only loosely connected
to his philosophy of erotic experience, which occupies most of the
book. The result is the unhappy marriage of a rather aesthetically
florid phenomenology of eroticism and Thatcherism. They are, as I
hope to show, strange bedfellows indeed.
Scruton's main aim is abstractly philosophical, namely, the
philosophical understanding of erotic experience, and the defense of
a certain view of it against a range of both ancient and contemporary accounts that, in his view, distort its nature and role. He emphasizes the distinctively imaginative aspect of human, in contrast
to animal, sexuality, and characterizes that aspect as an interpersonal intentionality directed at experience of one another's embodiment. The account is not novel, having been suggested earlier by
6.
(1985).
7.

See, e.g., Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Lawmaking, 84 MICH. L. REV. 352
See generally D. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION (1986).
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Thomas Nagel,s and Scruton adds little more than a rather mystifying way of putting the point of reciprocal interest in one another's
bodies.9 Scruton conceives his account as an alternative both to the
Augustinian essentialist view of sexuality as procreationalJo and to
the modern reductions of sexuality to physical orgasm that Scruton
associates with Freud, Kinsey, Masters and Johnson, and others.
In contrast to such views, Scruton affirms eroticism as a kind of
imaginatively elaborated communication of sexual interests in one
another's bodies.
It is odd to suppose that the integrity of sexual experience requires the interpersonal intentionality that Nagel and Scruton emphasize. Their view has the unacceptable consequence, for example,
that any sexual experience in which one of the parties lacks full
reciprocal intentionality must be a kind of perversion; this view
seems to condemn not only prostitution but every lover who takes
too little interest in his partner's pleasure.'' Scruton stretches the
concept of perversion to encompass anything that he regards as
outside the perimeter of morally defensible sex-masturbation, for
example. He thus fails, like many other conservative sexual moralists, to capture the nature and varieties of good sex and begs the
question of the morality of variant sexual styles.12
Scruton parodies Freud, Kinsey, and Masters and Johnson because he objects to the emancipatory criticisms of conventional sexual morality that their work unleashed, which he interprets as a
kind of depersonalization of sexual experience. The point of their
work, however, is exactly the converse: conventional sexual morality unreasonably constrains sexual experience within a narrow
range (for example, Augustinian procreational sexuality) and thus
stultifies the larger role of sexuality as an independently important
experience that becomes the humane bond of intrinsically valuable
companionate relationships. 13
8. See Nagel, Sexual Perversion, MORTAL QUESTIONS 39-52 (1972).
9. "In the full ardour of desire, each participant is striving to be present in his body,
and striving also to view his own striving from a point of view outside it," R. ScRUTON,
SEXUAL DESIRE 127. See also id. 289-90.
10. For pertinent discussion of Augustine's views and arguments, see D. RICHARDS,
SEX, DRUGS, DEATH AND THE LAW: AN EssAY ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND 0VERCRIMINALIZATION 37-38 (1982).
II. I take this criticism from Levy, Perversion and the Unnatural as Moral Categories,
90 ETHICS 191 (1980).
12. For elaboration of this point, see D. RICHARDS, supra note 10, at 97-112.
13. See, e.g., W. MASTERS & V. JOHNSON, THE PLEASURE BoND (1975). For exploration of emancipatory implications of their arguments, see D. RICHARDS, supra note 10, at 29153.
The distinction between animal and human sexuality was a central postulate of Freud's
emphasis on the distinctive role of sexuality in human personality:
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The abstract account of erotic experience that Scruton offers is,
if anything, more spiritually akin to this modernist understanding
of sexuality than it is to the traditional Augustinian view. But
Scruton interprets his account in a way that ties it closely to conventional sexual practices and attitudes. There is, he argues, no essentialistic truth of the person and therefore no essentialist truth
about erotic experience, but only conventional stylizations of that
experience. Scruton endorses the conventional stylization that we
associate with heterosexual marital monogamy, and he connects it
to a larger structure of historically legitimate institutions. His conservatism is like that of the high Tory tradition of Burke and
Oakeshott, which (as he puts it) founds its "picture of political order and legitimate government upon a perception of the nature of
domestic relations and the erotic bond which underlies them."
But no political tradition is as simplistically homogeneous as
Scruton supposes. For example, the British tradition includes,
among its glories, the liberalism of John Stuart Mill's The Subjection of Women and On Liberty, both of which support positions that
Scruton eschews. How are we to adjudicate while caught between
Scruton's and Mill's explication of the British tradition? And how
are we to adjudicate among competing interpretations of the American tradition, which includes the most radical guarantees of separation of secular and religious authority yet devised by the mind of
man?I 4 Presumably, we must offer arguments about which traditions are better or worse, more just or less unjust, and more humanely civilized or less barbarously cruel and prejudiced.
It is, after all, a distinctive feature of Western religion, ethics,
and law that the sense of enduring values is open to new empirical
and normative perspectives that often revise old assumptions (for
example, the inferiority of women or homosexuals) in the interest of
a deeper elaboration of more abstract values of equality and liberty.
Scruton dismisses the kind of historical sensitivity that Foucault
brought to the study of Western sexual morality, but whatever the
The sexual instinct ... is probably more strongly developed in man than in most of
the higher animals; it is certainly more constant, since it has almost entirely overcome the periodicity to which it is tied in animals. It places extraordinarily large
amounts of force at the disposal of civilized activity, and it does this in virtue of its
especially marked characteristic of being able to displace its aim without materially
diminishing in intensity. This capacity to exchange its originally sexual aim for
another one, which is no longer sexual but which is psychically related to the first
aim, is called the capacity for sublimation.
S. FREUD, 'Civilized' Sexual Morality and Modern Nervous Illness, in 9 COMPLETE PsYCHoLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 181, 187 (standard ed. 1959-1975). For a comparison
of the animal and human data, see C. FORD & F. BEACH, PATTERNS OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR
199-267 (1951).
14. See generally D. RICHARDS, supra note 7.
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merits of Foucault's account,ts it still raises the kind of historical
questions that any serious religious, ethical, or legal analysis should
bring to these issues.
Except to those who are already in his camp, Scruton's arguments are singularly unconvincing. Consider, for example, his pivotal discussion of sex and gender. Scruton attacks "Kantian
feminism," the view that "what I really and fundamentally am, for
myself and another, is a person." He rejects this view because he
believes that erotic experience belies it: the experience of sex is not
an experience of persons simpliciter, but of persons across "a great
ontological divide" of gender. Much of our moral and political experience today does not see women in this way, however, and regards the "ontological" weight that Scruton would give gender as a
kind of injustice akin to the now discredited use of stigmatizing racial classifications to set off racial minorities as a distinct moral species.t6 Heterosexuals and homosexuals are attracted to women or
men, as the case may be, but today the attraction is not polarized
around traditional gender stereotypes.t7 Thus, even from the perspective of the phenomenology of eroticism, Scruton's description
of sexual experience along rigid gender-defined lines is, as he acknowledges, a highly personal profession of faith in traditional
heterosexuality.
Scruton denigrates homosexual erotic love on the ground that
one's own gender is unmysteriously "experienced as through and
through familiar to you," and thus incapable of the full consummations of erotic experience that only ignite across the "great ontological divide" of gender. What does this mean? That erotic fires blaze
only if partners have different sex organs? This sounds like the biological reductionism Scruton deplores elsewhere, and as such it conveys a false picture of human sexual experience, doing violence to
the subtle variations of temperament and personality and character
that are the differentiating loci of erotic attraction and love, both
heterosexual and homosexual.ts At precisely the point where we
15. See I M. FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION, (R. Hurley trans. 1978); 2 THE USE OF PLEASURE: THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, (R. Hurley trans.
1985); 3 THE CARE OF THE SELF: THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, (R. Hurley trans. 1986).
16. The most brilliant exposition of this argument remains Mill's. See THE SuBJECTION OF WoMEN (1869). For a striking judicial exposition of this argument, see Justice
Brennan's opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
17. See, e.g., B. EHRENREICH, E. HESS & G. JACOBS, REMAKING LOVE: THE FEMINIZATION OF SEX (1986); H. GOLDBERG, THE HAZARDS OF BEING MALE (1976); J. PLECK &
J. SAWYER, MEN AND MASCULINITY (1974).
18. On the continuities in homosexual and heterosexual sexual experience and bonding,
seeP. BLUMSTEIN & P. SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES (1983); W. MASTERS & V. JOHNSON, HOMOSEXUALITY IN PERSPECTIVE (1979).
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need an argument as to why one tradition of sexual experience is to
be preferred over another, instead we get an intuitive appeal to a
now embattled conception of sexual experience, which masquerades
as the measure of all eroticism.
Scruton glorifies "[t]he nuptiality of desire," including a rich
repertoire of marital sexual techniques (for example, fellatio and
cunnilingus), and he justifies much sexual morality as a protection
against jealousy, "the greatest of psychical catastrophes." But
surely these interests cannot be narrowly limited to heterosexual relationships in the way that Scruton assumes. Doesn't the failure of
law to accord similar marital protections to homosexuals represent
a refusal to respect their interests in "the nuptiality of desire"?
Although Scruton's criticisms of homosexuality are considerably more tentative than one might expect, he does regard it as
intrinsically imperfect. This is because homosexuality denies Scruton's phenomenological premise "that gender distinctions play a
constitutive role in the sexual act." But Scruton's account is, even
on its own terms, strained and unconvincing. The general form of
Scruton's philosophy of the erotic (namely, a reciprocal intentionality of mutual embodiment) is, as Nagel's more persuasive account
shows,I9 quite consistent with homosexual love, for such love may
as fully express erotic reciprocal intentionality as the most fiery heterosexual lovemaking. Ultimately, Scruton offers little more than
conservative dogmatism.
II

G. Sidney Buchanan's Morality, Sex, and the Constitution is an
avowedly Christian perspective on the power of government to regulate sexual morality. Buchanan's conception of enforceable sexual
morality rests on two alternative grounds: (1) the right of democratic majorities to impose their moral views, or (2) the enforcement
of sectarian religious views. But neither Buchanan's majoritarianism nor his sectarianism is a legitimate principle of constitutional
law in the way he supposes.
The scope of the majority rule principle in American constitutionalism is circumscribed by procedural and substantive limits that
are designed, in the terms of Madison's classic argument, to curb
the powers of "factions." As defined by Madison, a faction is
"a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common
impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citi19.

See Nagel, supra note 8, at 50-51.
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zens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community. "2o We think today of racism and sexism as exemplifying such
factionalized prejudices; and we regard the equal protection clause
as a prohibition on the enforcement of moral views that express
them. But as Madison clearly saw, religious sectarianism also exemplifies the evils of faction. The religion clauses of the first
amendment-which Madison authored-are substantive constraints on the expression of sectarian religious views through law .21
Therefore, it does not suffice to cite the principle of majority rule as
the ground for enforcing moral views through law, for such
majoritarian moral views may flout essential constitutional principles and not provide a proper basis for law.
Unfortunately, the only account Buchanan offers of enforceable public morality, beyond the majority rule principle, is an appeal
to sectarian morality. This becomes quite clear in his defense of the
constitutionality of the continuing prohibition of same-sex marriages. Although Buchanan defends the expansion of the constitutional right to privacy to homosexual acts, he draws the line at
homosexual marriage, which he regards as too great an attack on a
majoritarian moral value. But Buchanan explains the moral value
in question in terms of a religiously sacramental conception of marriage, which he freely concedes does not have a secular rational basis. If Buchanan cannot offer a secular argument for denying a
public good like marriage to homosexuals, he is using the law to
deny fair respect to the rights and interests of a minority group for
the sake of the heterosexual majority that is crudely insensitive to
its claims. I believe it is precisely this factionalized oppression that
flouts core principles of American public law.
Roger J. Magnuson's Are Gay Rights Right? is, unlike
Buchanan's moderate and centrist argument, an attack by a religious fundamentalist on the very idea of gay rights. Magnuson not
only simplifies the theological debates over the alleged biblical condemnations of homosexuality,22 but naively supposes these debates
to be dispositive on issues of constitutional justice in the United
States. That would be enough to remove this book from serious
consideration as a constitutional argument. But the constitutional
flaw of the book cuts much deeper. For Magnuson, homosexuality
is a kind of heretical attack on fundamental values, and he wants to
eradicate this subversive menace. This is the sort of crusade that
20.
21.
22.
(1980).

THE FEDERALIST No. 10 at 78 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
For more extensive analysis, see D. RICHARDS, supra note 7, at 67-162.
See J. BosWELL, CHRISTIANITY, SociAL TOLERANCE AND HOMOSEXUALITY
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the Bill of Rights should prevent: "[h]eresy trials are foreign to our
Constitution, "23 and there is nothing more erosive of the spiritual
fabric of American public law than to exile any group from the basic rights of all Americans on the ground that their beliefs, or
speech, or way of life is a heresy to the true American tradition. We
need to be more, not less, sensitive to the constitutional claims of
homosexuals today precisely because they are unjustly targeted as
vulnerable political exiles from the constitutional community of
equal rights under law.24

SUING THE PRESS. By Rodney A. Smolla.1 New York,
N.Y.: Oxford University Press. 1986. Pp. 277. $19.95.
Mark Silverstein 2
Rarely is a Supreme Court decision greeted as enthusiastically
as was New York Times v. Sullivan. For years, Supreme Court dicta
had placed libel and slander outside the protection of the first
amendment, leaving the print and broadcast media subject to potentially huge libel judgments under the vagaries of state libel laws.
Concluding that a rule of law that required newspapers to guarantee
the truth of all assertions inhibited public debate, the Court in New
York Times held that the first amendment bars public officials from
recovering damages for defamatory statements without proof that
the challenged statements were made with knowledge of their falsity
or with reckless disregard for whether they were true or false. In
repudiating the old doctrine of seditious libel and proclaiming the
free and unfettered exchange of ideas to be the hallmark of a society
dedicated to self-government, the Court won overwhelming approval for a decision considered by knowledgeable observers to be
an important step toward the ideal of an open and democratic society. Moreover, the decision appeared to herald the emergence of
the media, the federal courts and the black civil rights movement as
a powerful coalition destined to change the very nature of American
politics. Hence the decision in New York Times not only nationalized the libel laws of the fifty states in the name of more effective
self-government, but it also symbolized the dynamic political and
social changes of the 1960s. Small wonder that as astute a critic as
23. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) (Douglas, J., writing for the Court).
24. I develop this argument at greater length in Richards, Constitutional Legitimacy
and Constitutional Privacy, N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming).
I. Associate Professor of Law, University of Arkansas.
2. Assistant Professor of Political Science, Boston University.

